Abstract. We consider the family of 2n-to-n-bit compression functions that are solely based on at most three permutation executions and on XOR-operators, and analyze its collision and preimage security. Despite their elegance and simplicity, these designs are not covered by the results of Rogaway and Steinberger (CRYPTO 2008). By defining a carefully chosen equivalence relation on this family of compression functions, we obtain the following results. In the setting where the three permutations π1, π2, π3 are selected independently and uniformly at random, there exist at most four equivalence classes that achieve optimal 2 n/2 collision resistance. Under a certain extremal graph theory based conjecture, these classes are then proven optimally collision secure. Three of these classes allow for finding preimages in 2 n/2 queries, and only one achieves optimal 2 2n/3 preimage resistance (with respect to the bounds of Rogaway and Steinberger, EUROCRYPT 2008). Consequently, a compression function is optimally collision and preimage secure if and only if it is equivalent to F(x1, x2) = x1 ⊕π1(x1)⊕π2(x2)⊕π3(x1 ⊕x2 ⊕π1(x1)). For compression functions that make three calls to the same permutation we obtain a surprising negative result, namely the impossibility of optimal 2 n/2 collision security: for any scheme, collisions can be found with 2 2n/5 queries. This result casts some doubt over the existence of any (larger) secure permutation-based compression function built only on XOR-operators and (multiple invocations of) a single permutation.
Introduction
The traditional recipe for the design of a cryptographic hash function is to base it on one or more block ciphers. Since the late 70s, this methodology developed itself to become the dominating approach in the area of hash function design and plenty of hash functions have been constructed accordingly (either explicitly or implicitly) [3, 4, 6, 7] . These designs are, however, characterized by the fact that the key input to the cipher depends on the input values; this implies that the key schedule has to be strong and that it needs to be executed for every encryption (or for every second encryption), which entails a substantial computational cost. An alternative approach is to fix one or more keys, and restrict the hash function design to use the block cipher for these keys only. The usage of fixed-key block ciphers, or alternatively permutations, additionally causes gain that one does not need to implement an entire block cipher but only a limited number of instantiations of it.
Black, Cochran and Shrimpton [1] were the first to formally study this approach, demonstrating that a 2n-to-n-bit compression function F using one n-bit permutation π cannot be secure. This result has been generalized by Rogaway and Steinberger [10] , and refined by Stam [12] and Steinberger [13] . Consider any mn-to-rn-bit compression function using k n-bit permutations: if 2 n(2m−2r−k+1)/(k+1) ≥ 17, collisions can be found in at most (2 n ) 1−(m−r+1)/(k+1) queries to the underlying primitives, a bound proven by Steinberger in [13] but commonly known as "Stam's bound." Collisions and preimages can even be found in at most (2 n ) 1−(m−r/2)/k and (2 n ) 1−(m−r)/k queries respectively, provided the compression function satisfies the "uniformity assumption" [10] . Due to Stam's bound, a 2n-to-n-bit compression function, which is the simplest case after all, achieves optimal 2 n/2 collision resistance only if it employs at least three permutations. Yet, it cannot achieve optimal preimage resistance if it fulfills the uniformity assumption. These observations apply to the "multi-permutation setting", where each of the permutations is generated independently, as well as the "single-permutation setting" where the permutations are the same.
The construction of 2n-to-n-bit compression functions (based on three permutations) that provably attain optimal collision security, has turned out to be a very challenging exercise. In [9], Rogaway and Steinberger formally proved a broad class of 2n-to-n-bit compression functions using three distinct permutations and finite field scalar multiplications optimally collision and preimage secure (w.r.t. the bounds of [10] ), provided the compression function satisfies a so-called "independence criterion" (a similar result for the single-permutation setting has been obtained by Lee and Kwon [5] ). Unfortunately, this technical criterion rules out the most intuitive and elegant type of designs, namely compression functions that are (apart from the three permutations) solely based on XOR-operators. As the proof of [9] extensively relies on its independence criterion, the proof cannot be generalized to compression functions of this type. In [11] , Shrimpton and Stam derived a XOR-based compression function, using three one-way functions rather than permutations: F(x 1 , x 2 ) = f 1 (x 1 ) ⊕ f 3 (f 1 (x 1 ) ⊕ f 2 (x 2 )). This function is proven collision resistant up to 2 n/2 queries (asymptotically), but preimages can be found with high probability after 2 n/2 queries [11] . It has been demonstrated by an automated analysis of Rogaway and Steinberger [9] that the same results hold if f 1 , f 2 , f 3 are Davies-Meyer-like compression functions using permutations π 1 , π 2 , π 3 , i.e. f i (x) = x ⊕ π i (x), but a formal security analysis has never been given. Since these works, a synthetic formal collision and preimage security analysis of XOR-based compression functions has remained an interesting and important theoretical open problem, because of their elegance and simplicity (the functions only employ XOR-operators) as well as their slight efficiency improvement (XOR-operators are slightly cheaper than finite field multiplications).
Our Contributions. We focus on the entire family of 2n-to-n-bit compression functions constructed only of three isolated permutations and of XOR-operators, and analyze the security of these functions against information-theoretic adversaries. For each of the functions, we either provide a proof of optimal collision resistance or a collision attack faster than the birthday bound. We also analyze the preimage resistance of the schemes that have optimal collision security.
The approach followed in this work is based on defining an equivalence class on the set of compression functions, and is of independent interest: informally, two compression functions are equivalent if there exists a tight bi-directional preimage and collision security reduction (cf. Def. 3). Consequently, security results of one compression function hold for the entire class, and it suffices to analyze the security of one function per class. In this work we restrict to equivalence reductions that are easy to verify, such as interchanging the inputs to the compression function.
For the multi-permutation setting, where the three permutations π 1 , π 2 , π 3 are assumed to be selected independently and uniformly at random, the results are as follows. A compression function F is optimally collision secure (asymptotically) if and only if it is equivalent to one of the four compression functions F 1 , . . . , F 4 :
These compression functions are depicted in Fig. 1 . Not surprisingly, the permutation-based variant of the Shrimpton-Stam compression function [11] is included, it equals F 3 . For compression functions non-equivalent to any of F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , F 4 , collisions can be found faster than the birthday bound, namely in at most 2 2n/5 queries. Compression functions equivalent to F 2 are proven optimally preimage secure up to 2 2n/3 queries, and compression functions equivalent to F 1 , F 3 or F 4 are additionally shown to achieve tight 2 n/2 preimage security. Therefore, a compression function achieves optimal collision and preimage resistance (w.r.t. the bounds of [10] ) if and only if it is equivalent to F 2 . Particularly, this class of functions beats the Shrimpton-Stam compression function [11] with respect to preimage resistance. These results are summarized in Table 1 . A minor part of the results in the multi-permutation setting, more concretely the collision resistance of F 1 , F 2 and F 4 and the preimage resistance of F 2 , are based on an extremal graph theory based conjecture. Informally, this conjecture bounds the number of solutions (
, where X 1 , X 2 , X 3 are three sets of q elements. This conjecture is similar to (but more complex than) a problem posed by Zarankiewicz in 1951 (cf. [2, Ch. 6.2]), and is of independent interest. In App. D, we analyze our conjecture in more detail, provide it with a heuristic argument, and compare it with the conjecture of Zarankiewicz. ? ?
In the single-permutation setting, where the compression function makes three calls to the same random permutation π, there does not exist any compression function that achieves optimal collision resistance. In particular, for any possible function, collisions can be found in at most 2 2n/5 queries, beating the desired birthday bound. This negative result is surprising, given the fair amount of secure functions we have found in the multi-permutation setting. The attacks mainly rely on the fact that the adversary can misuse the single-permutation property by introducing dependencies between the two input values x 1 and x 2 . For instance, the function F 2 of (1) satisfies Fig. 1 . A graphical representation of the compression functions F 1 , . . . , F 4 of (1).
ting. This result raises the interesting question whether (larger) compression functions exist based only on XOR-operators and (more than three invocations of) one single permutation.
Outline. In Sect. 2, we present some background information, and formally describe the set of permutation-based compression functions we have analyzed. In Sect. 3, the equivalence relation on the set of compression functions is formally defined. The main results are given in Sect. 4 for the multi-permutation setting and in Sect. 5 for the single-permutation setting.
We conclude the paper in Sect. 6.
Preliminaries
For an integer n ∈ N, we denote by {0, 1} n the set of bit strings of length n. For two bit strings x, y, we denote by x y their concatenation and by x ⊕ y their bitwise XOR. If X is a set, by x $ ← X we denote the uniformly random sampling of an element from X . For two integers m, n ∈ N, we denote by m n the encoding of m as an n-bit string. By log we denote the logarithm function with respect to base 2. By P n we denote the set of all permutations operating on n bits. Vectors are denoted as x, and by x = i |x i | we denote the 1-norm of x. For a matrix A, by a i,j we denote its coefficient at the i th row and j th column. By a i, * we denote the i th row of A, and by a * ,j its j th column.
Permutation Based Compression Functions
We consider the following type of 2n-to-n-bit compression functions. Let π 1 , π 2 , π 3 ∈ P n be three permutations. 
the compression function F A : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} n is defined as follows:
The function F A is depicted in Fig. 2 . If the three permutations are all different, we refer to it as the multi-permutation setting. If π 1 , π 2 , π 3 are equal to one permutation π, we are in the single-permutation setting. In total, we thus analyze 2 · 2 14 compression functions. Many of these, however, are trivially weak (cf. Sect. 2.3).
For the single-permutation setting, it is of interest to also consider the case where n-bit constants are added to the inputs to the permutations (e.g. y 1 ← π 1 (a 11 x 1 ⊕ a 12 x 2 ⊕ b 1 ) for b 1 ∈ {0, 1} n ). This results in many more schemes, but requires a more complex analysis. Therefore, we present our main results on F A of (3), and in App. C we generalize our findings on the single-permutation setting to cover any F A where additional affine transformations on the permutation inputs are taken into account. Fig. 2 . The permutation-based compression function F A of (3).
Security Notions
An adversary is a probabilistic algorithm with oracle access to the underlying permutations π 1 , π 2 , π 3 . He can make forward and inverse queries to its oracles, and the queries are stored in a query history Q. By (x k , y k ) ∈ Q, for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote that y k = π k (x k ); the adversary either made a forward query x k to obtain y k or an inverse query y k to obtain x k . In the remainder, we assume that Q always contains the queries required for the attack, and we assume that the adversary does not make trivial queries, i.e. queries to which the adversary already knows the answer in advance. In this work we consider information-theoretic adversaries only. This type of adversary has unbounded computational power, and its complexity is measured by the number of queries made to its oracles. Definition 1. Let F A : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} n be a compression function defined by a matrix A of the form (2). Let A be a collision finding adversary for this compression function. The advantage of A is defined as
By Adv col F A (q) we denote the maximum advantage, taken over all adversaries makingueries to each of their oracles.
Several definitions for preimage resistance are known, but we opt for everywhere preimage resistance [8] , which intuitively guarantees preimage security for every range point. Definition 2. Let F A : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} n be a compression function defined by a matrix A of the form (2). Let A be an everywhere preimage finding adversary for this compression function. The advantage of A is defined as
By Adv epre F A (q) we denote the maximum advantage, taken over all adversaries makingueries to each of their oracles.
The security definitions for the single-permutation setting, where the compression function is built on one permutation π, are analogous.
Invalid Matrices
We will classify the set of optimally collision secure compression functions F A of the form described in Sect. 2.1, but for some matrices A the induced compression function will clearly not fulfill the desired security requirements. For instance, if a compression function does not use one or more permutations, attacks faster than the birthday bound can easily be constructed. We introduce the notion of "valid" matrices, in order to rule out compression functions that trivially fail to achieve optimal collision resistance. A matrix A is called "valid" if it satisfies the following properties:
(1) For the j th column (j = 1, 2), we have a 1j + a 2j + a 3j ≥ 1. This requirement ensures that input x j is used in the computation of at least one permutation. If this would not be the case, collisions can easily be constructed; (2) For the j th column (j = 3, 4, 5), we have a * ,j ≥ 1, and for the i th row (i = 1, 2, 3), we have a i, * ≥ 1. Notice that if the i th row (resp. j th column) would consist of zeroes only, it means that permutation π i (resp. π j−2 ) is not used in the computation, and collisions can be found in at most 2 n/3 queries by Stam's bound [12, 13] .
In the remainder, we will consider valid matrices A only. By an extensive computation one can show that 2796 < 2 12 out of 2 14 matrices are valid (for both the single-and multi-permutation setting).
Equivalence Classes of Permutation Based Compression Functions
We define an equivalence relation on the set of compression functions F A . This equivalence relation intuitively describes classes of "equally secure" compression functions, and can be used to reduce the number of compression functions to be analyzed. Indeed, security properties of one compression function naturally convey to all compression functions in the same equivalence class. The equivalence relation is defined in Def. 3, and in Props. 1-4 we describe the four equivalence reductions that will be used in this work.
Definition 3. Two compression functions F A and F A are equivalent if for both collision and preimage security there exists a tight reduction from F A to F A , and vice versa.
Proposition 1 (x-reduction). Consider two matrices A = a * ,1 ; a * ,2 ; a * ,3 ; a * ,4 ; a * , 5 and A = a * ,2 ; a * ,1 ; a * ,3 ; a * ,4 ; a * ,5 . Then, the compression functions F A and F A are equivalent. Intuitively, this reduction corresponds to swapping x 1 and x 2 .
Proposition 2 (XOR-reduction). Consider a matrix A = a * ,1 ; a * ,2 ; a * ,3 ; a * ,4 ; a * ,5 , and let
where [X] = 1 if X holds and 0 otherwise. Then, the compression functions F A and F A are equivalent. Intuitively, π k is the first permutation that incorporates x 2 , and this reduction represents replacing x 2 by x 2 ⊕ c 0
, where y i is the outcome of the i th permutation. Using Prop. 1, the same reduction holds for x 1 .
Proposition 3 (π-swap-reduction). Let i ∈ {1, 2}, and consider a matrix A with a i+1,i+2 = 0. Consider the matrix A obtained from A by swapping rows a i, * and a i+1, * and consequently swapping columns a * ,i+2 and a * ,i+3 . Then, the compression functions F A and F A are equivalent. Intuitively, this reduction corresponds to swapping π i and π i+1 , which is only possible if the outcome of π i is not used as input of π i+1 (i.e. if a i+1,i+2 = 0). Proof (Proof of Props. 1-4). Let F A and F A be two compression functions defined as in either of the propositions. For simplicity, in case of Prop. 2 we only consider k = 2 (so a 12 = 0, a 22 = 1 and c 2 = 0), for Prop. 3 we only consider i = 1 (so a 23 = 0). By construction, the compression functions F A and F A satisfy the following properties:
for Prop. 3,
We need to provide a bi-directional collision and preimage security reduction. For conciseness, we will provide only the collision security reduction; the case of preimage resistance is similar and is therefore omitted. Let A be a collision finding adversary for the compression function
. We construct a collision finding adversary A for F A that uses A as a subroutine and on input of π 1 , π 2 , π 3
A . Adversary A operates as follows:
1. In Props. 1 and 2, the adversary A sends (
Notice that in step one, the permutations (π 1 , π 2 , π 3 ) are clearly randomly and independently distributed as (π 1 , π 2 , π 3 ) are, and therefore A can output (
For F A of Prop. 3, these tuples indeed render a collision as given in step 3:
The same argument applies to the other propositions. In any case, A needs at most four queries more than A, and thus we obtain Adv
The reductions in the other direction (from F A to F A ) are identical due to symmetry.
Except for Prop. 4, the reductions also hold in the single-permutation setting. We remark that these reductions are not only restricted to binary matrices, but apply to general matrices A. In particular, the independence criterion of [9] can be derived using the given reductions. Also, we note that the reductions can easily be represented by linear matrix operations.
We classify the set of permutation-based compression functions of the form (3) that achieve optimal collision resistance. Theorem 1 shows that the set of (asymptotically) secure functions is fully covered by four equivalence classes; for any other compression function collisions can be found faster than the birthday bound. One of these four classes -defined by F A 2 belowprovides optimal (asymptotic) 2 2n/3 preimage security, for the other three classes preimages can be found significantly faster. Theorem 1. Consider the multi-permutation setting. Let F A be any compression function defined by a binary matrix A of the form (2). Let F A k for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 be the compression functions defined by matrices 
In other words, a compression function offers optimal collision resistance if and only if it is equivalent to either of
, and additionally achieves optimal preimage resistance (with respect to the bounds of [10]) if and only if it is equivalent to F A 2 .
In order to prove Thm. 1, more specifically part (i) for k = 1, 2, 4 and part (ii), we pose the following conjecture. This conjecture relates to the area of extremal graph theory and is of independent interest. In particular, it can be shown to be similar to (but more complex than) a longstanding problem of Zarankiewicz from 1951 [2, Ch. 6.2]. Conjecture 1. Let q ≤ 2 n , and let Z be a set of q elements taken uniformly at random from {0, 1} n . Let β denote the maximum number of tuples (x 1 , x 2 , z) ∈ X 1 × X 2 × Z such that x 1 ⊕ x 2 = z, where X 1 , X 2 are any two subsets of {0, 1} n of size q. Formally:
There exists a constant
The first bound is used in the proof Thm. 1(i) for k = 1, 2, 4, and the second bound in the proof Thm. 1(ii). A detailed heuristic for Conj. 1 is given in App. D, together with a comparison with Zarankiewicz's conjecture, but we leave a full proof of Conj. 1 as an open problem.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Thm. 1 is structured as follows. Firstly, in Lem. 1 we show that any compression function F A can be reduced either to an invalid compression function or to a compression function F A defined by a matrix A with first two rows 10000, 01000. By construction (see Sect. 3), the security properties of one compression function are valid for the whole equivalence class. Secondly, in Lem. 2 several collision attacks are described that invalidate the security of each of the remaining compression functions, except for the classes defined by F A k (k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) for A k as in (5) . Thirdly, the collision and preimage resistance of the remaining four compression functions are analyzed in Lem. 3, which completes the proof of Thm. 1. Lemma 1. Any compression function F A , for valid A, is equivalent to a compression function F A , where either A is invalid or the first two rows of A equal 10000, 01000.
Proof. The proof is constructive. Several reductions are used, but for ease of notation apostrophes are omitted. Let F A be a compression function defined by some valid matrix A. As A is valid, we have a 11 + a 12 ≥ 1. If a 11 + a 12 = 2, we can apply Prop. 2 on c 0 = 1 to obtain a 11 + a 12 = 1. Now, by Prop. 1 we can assume that (a 11 , a 12 ) = (1, 0).
Considering the second row of A, we distinguish between a 22 = 1 and a 22 = 0. In the former case, a XOR-reduction (Prop. 2) on (c 0 , c 1 ) = (a 21 , a 23 ) reduces the scheme to the required form. In the latter case, where a 22 = 0, we proceed as follows. If a 32 = 0, A is equivalent to an invalid matrix. Otherwise, by applying Prop. 2 with (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) = (a 31 , a 33 , a 34 ) we obtain that F A is equivalent to a compression function F A , for some matrix A with rows (10000, a 21 0a 23 00, 01000, a 41 a 42 a 43 a 44 a 45 ). The result is now obtained by swapping π 2 and π 3 (Prop. 3 for i = 2).
As a direct consequence of Lem. 1, it suffices to consider compression functions for some binary values a 31 , . . . , a 44 . Notice that a 45 = 1 because of the validity of the matrix. We describe a couple of collision attacks that apply to compression functions of this form. We note that similar results also hold for preimage resistance. Lemma 2. Let F A be a compression function defined by a valid matrix A of the form (7).
For clarity, the proofs of results (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) will be given separately. 
Proof (Proof of Lem. 2(i)
. A collision-finding adversary A for F A proceeds as follows. He sets up two lists of q random elements X 1 := {x 2 ) (for k = 1, . . . , q). Thus, in total A makesueries to each of his random oracles. Given one of the q 2 2 combinations x 1 , x 1 ∈ X 1 , x 2 , x 2 ∈ X 2 , this combination yields a collision for F A with probability Θ(2 −n ). Concluding, Adv
Proof (Proof of Lem. 2(ii)). For the cases j ∈ {3, 4} as explained in Sect. 2.3 (these cases are in fact redundant due to the validity of A), collisions can be found in at most 2 n/3 queries due to Stam's bound [12, 13] . We consider a matrix A with a 32 = a 42 = 0 (the case j = 2), a similar analysis holds for j = 1. Note that F A satisfies F A (x 1 , x 2 ) = F A (x 1 , π 2 (x 2 )), where A has third and fourth rows (a 31 a 34 a 33 00, a 41 a 44 a 43 01). The compression function F A satisfies the condition of this lemma for j = 4, and invertibility of π 2 guarantees a collision for F A in the same amount of queries plus 2. We note that the result also follows from Prop. 4, but as we will use Lem. 2(ii) in the single-permutation setting as well, we here consider a more robust reduction.
Proof (Proof of Lem. 2(iii)). The idea of the attack is to focus on collisions (x 1 , x 2 ) = (x 1 , x 2 ) for which the input to the third permutation π 3 is the same. We first consider the case of matrices A with a 31 a 32 a 33 a 34 a 41 a 42 a 43 a 44 = 1 1 0 0 a 41 a 42 1 1 , the general case is discussed afterwards. The matrix defines compression function
We construct an adversary A that aims at finding a collision (x 1 , x 2 ) = (x 1 , x 2 ) such that
The adversary sets up two lists of q = 2 α elements X 1 := {x
1 } and X 2 := {x
Then, there is exactly one x 2 such that (8a) is satisfied. For any of these2 options, (8b) is satisfied with probability Θ(2 −n ). For any of such succeeding tuples, the adversary additionally queries π 3 (x 1 ⊕ x 2 ) = π 3 (x 1 ⊕ x 2 ) in order to get a collision. Concluding, Adv col F A (q) = Ω(q 3 /2 n ). The described attack relies on the key property that the set of equations a 31 a 32 a 33 a 34 a 41 a 42 a 43 a 44 ( contains at least two zeroes. If two zeroes are located in the same row, this key property is satisfied and the attack succeeds. On the other hand, if both rows contain exactly one zero, one can XOR the first equation to the second one to return to the first case.
Proof (Proof of Lem. 2(iv)).
Without loss of generality, we assume a 41 = 1. By Lem. 2(ii), we can consider a 32 = a 33 = a 34 = 1. The matrix defines compression function
We construct a collision adversary A for F A . The adversary sets up a list of q = 2 α random elements X 2 := {x 
2 ) (for k = 1, . . . , q). Additionally, the adversary sets up two lists X 1 := {x 
3 ) (for k = 1, . . . , q). Fix any x 1 , y 3 , x 1 such that x 1 = x 1 . Then, there is exactly one y 3 such that x 1 ⊕ y 3 = x 1 ⊕ y 3 . The adversary obtains a collision for F A if X 2 contains two elements x 2 , x 2 such that x 2 ⊕y 2 = a 31 x 1 ⊕y 1 ⊕x 3 and x 2 ⊕ y 2 = a 31 x 1 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ x 3 . Two such x 2 , x 2 exist with probability Ω( q 2 /2 2n ). As the adversary needs to succeed for only one of the2 choices of x 1 , y 3 , x 1 , he finds a collision for F A with probability Ω(q 5 /2 2n ).
Next, the compression functions evolved from Lem. 1 are analyzed with respect to the attacks of Lem. 2. Before proceeding, we remark that for the multi-permutation setting, the following reductions apply to the compression function classes evolved from Lem. 1. We refer to these reductions as the "M-and N-reduction". for j ∈ {1, 2}.
We now continue evaluating the matrices A of the form (7) 
a 3, * = 4. Due to M-and N-reductions, it suffices to consider a 41 a 42 a 43 a 44 ∈ {0000, 1000, 1010, 1100, 1110, 1111}. The cases 1000 and 1100 are vulnerable to the attacks of Lems. 2(iv) and 2(iii), respectively. For the cases 0000 and 1111, finding collisions is as hard as finding collisions for
2 ) (for which collisions are found in at most 2 n/3 queries, due to Stam's bound [12, 13] ). We are left with A 3 and A 4 of (5):
It remains to analyze collision and preimage security of the four compression functions defined by the matrices of (5), which is done in the following lemma. Particularly, Lem. 3 completes the proof of Thm. 1.
Lemma 3. Let ε > 0. Then:
(ii) lim n→∞ Adv epre F A 2 (2 2n/3(1−ε) ) = 0, and Adv
Proof. Part (i) is proven in App. A, part (ii) in App. B.
Main Result for Single-Permutation Setting
In a similar fashion as in Sect. 4, we analyze the security of compression functions based on three calls to the same permutations, the single-permutation setting. It turns out that there does not exist any compression function of the form (3) that achieves optimal collision resistance. We note that this result does not rely on Conj. 1. In App. C we show how the results of this section can be generalized to cover any single-permutation compression function where additional affine transformations on the permutation inputs are taken into account.
Theorem 2. Consider the single-permutation setting, where π 1 = π 2 = π 3 =: π. Any compression function F A defined by a binary matrix A of the form (2) satisfies Adv
Proof. The proof of Thm. 2 is similar to the proof of Thm. 1, and we highlight the differences. Lemmas 1 and 2 still apply, and additionally the M-reduction also holds in the singlepermutation setting. Notice that the N-reduction does not hold as it incorporates Prop. 4. Similar to before, we will evaluate the matrices A of the form (7). The case a 3, * ≤ 2 is the same as before. a 3, * = 3. Due to M-reductions, it suffices to consider a 31 a 32 a 33 a 34 ∈ {1110, 0111}.
-a 31 a 32 a 33 a 34 = 1110. The same analysis as in Sect. 4.1 applies, leaving the matrices A 1 and A 2 of (5). In the single-permutation setting, the two corresponding compression functions satisfy 
Hence, the analyzed compression functions either allow for trivial collision or are vulnerable to Lem. 2, therewith allowing for collisions in at most 2 2n/5 queries.
Concluding, for any compression function F A of the form (3), where the three permutations are equal to one single permutation π, collisions can be found in at most 2 2n/5 queries, hence considerably faster than in 2 n/2 queries.
Conclusions
We provided a full security classification of 2n-to-n-bit compression functions that are solely built of XOR-operators and of three permutations. Therewith, we have analyzed compression functions that are not included in the analysis of Rogaway and Steinberger [9] , but yet are interesting because of their elegance (they only employ XOR-operators) and efficiency (XORoperators are slightly cheaper than finite field multiplications by constants). For any of the 2 15 compression functions of the described form, we either provide a formal collision and preimage security proof or a collision attack more efficient than the birthday bound.
For the multi-permutation setting, where the three permutations are different, there are exactly four equivalence classes of functions that allow for optimal collision resistance, one class of which the compression functions achieve optimal preimage resistance w.r.t. the bounds of [10] . A summary of these results is given in Table 1 . Regarding the absolute number of collision/preimage secure compression functions, by ways of an extensive computation one finds 96 functions equivalent to F A 1 (including the
For the single-permutation setting, where the three permutations are the same, we show that it is not possible to construct a 2n-to-n-bit compression function that achieves optimal collision resistance. In light of the amount of optimally secure compression functions we have found in the multi-permutation setting, this observation is not as expected. This negative result casts doubts over the existence of any (larger) permutation-based XOR-based compression function built on (multiple invocations of) one single permutation. We leave this question as an open problem.
The results in this work are derived in the permutation setting. Different results may be obtained if we consider three underlying primitives to be one-way functions: in particular, the π-inverse-reduction (Prop. 4) and Lem. 2 rely on the invertibility of these primitives. Further research questions include the applicability of the approach followed in this work to different classes of compression functions, for instance with larger domain and range, with more permutations or random functions instead, or defined over different fields.
[9] Rogaway, P., Steinberger, J.: Constructing cryptographic hash functions from fixed-key blockciphers. In:
Advances 
A Proof of Lemma 3(i)
For F A k (k = 1, . . . , 4), where the matrices A k are given in (5), the goal is to prove that lim n→∞ Adv col F A k (2 n/2(1−ε) ) = 0 for any ε > 0, demonstrating the asymptotic collision security of F A k . In the remainder of this section, π 1 , π 2 , π 3 are assumed to be three permutations taken uniformly at random from P n .
The approach followed in this proof is as follows: finding a collision for a function F A , with A of the form (7), corresponds to obtaining query pairs (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 1 , y 1 ) for π 1 , (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) for π 2 , and (x 3 , y 3 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) for π 3 in the query history, such that:
(recall that the adversary is required to make the correct queries in order to form the collision). We will analyze the maximum probability of any adversary, making at mostueries to his oracles, in breaking (9), which equals Adv col F A (q) by definition. Denote by Q i for i = 1, . . . , q the first i queries of the query history Q q . To bound Adv col F A (q), we distinguish among the possibilities that x j = x j (for j = 1, 2, 3). Formally, we obtain
Pr solution for (9)
x j = x j ⇐⇒ c j = 1 (j = 1, 2, 3) .
Returning to the four compression functions F A k (k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}), this leaves 32 cases to be evaluated, but for some choices of c 1 c 2 c 3 the probability on the right hand side of (10) equals 0. Starting with F A 1 , the cases c 1 c 2 c 3 ∈ {110, 111} violate (9a), the case 010 would give contradiction for (9d), and 101 would give a contradiction in lines (9b-9c). On the other side, the case c 1 c 2 c 3 = 000 corresponds to E 1 (Q q ) of Fig. 3 , and similarly the cases 001, 011, and 100 correspond to events E 5 (Q q ), E 9 (Q q ), E 10 (Q q ) of Fig. 3 , respectively. A similar analysis can be applied to F A 2 , F A 3 , F A 4 to obtain the results of Table 2 . In general, the following holds for F A k , where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}:
collision for Here, the events E l (Q q ) (l ∈ {1, . . . , 13}) are given in Fig. 3 . Thus, it remains to analyze the probabilities of the events E l (Q q ) to occur, but we will analyze these under the condition that the previous query did not result in success, and some additional condition C(Q q ) = C 1∨...∨4 (Q q ), where the claims C 1 (Q q ), . . . , C 4 (Q q ) are given in Fig. 4 :
Similarly, the second probability of this bound can be split up further:
Applying this trick q times eventually gives the following probability bound on E l (Q q ):
The remainder of the section is now divided as follows. In App. A.1, we will bound the conditioned events E l (Q q ) to occur for l ∈ {1, . . . , 13} (first sum of (12)). Then, in App. A.2, a bound on the occurrence of C(Q q ) is computed (second sum of (12)). The results are assembled in App. A.3, to prove Lem. 3(i).
A.1 Bounding Occurrence of Conditioned
In this section, we bound the conditioned events E l (Q q ) (for l = 1, . . . , 13) to occur, more specifically the first sum of (12). The cases l = 1, 2, 3, 4 are found in Lems. 4-7, respectively. The cases l = 10, 11, 12 are found in Lem. 8, and the remaining cases in Lem. 9. Let d 1 be the constant defined in Conj. 1. On input of parameters (q, n), we define ε c (q, n) = Pr (β > d 1 q log q) of Conj. 1. This quantity tends to 0 for n → ∞ and for q < 2 n/2 . In the remainder of this work, we define q 1 = d 1 q log q. We will also consider Conj. 1 on inputs (q 1 , n) and (K 2 q, n), where K 2 is a parameter used in Fig. 4 .
Proof. We write E 1 a, E 1 b and E 1 c for the three equations of E 1 (Q) (Fig. 3) . We first bound the success probability of the i th query (i = 1, . . . , q), and then we sum over all values of i. Assume first the adversary makes a query x
3 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries x 3 → y 3 , x 2 → y 2 or x 2 → y 2 ). By Conj. 1, there exist at most q 1 tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that E 1 b is satisfied, except w.p. at most ε c (q, n). Denote E 1 (Q) : (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) ∈ Q s.t. y 1 ), (x 1 , y 1 ) , (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) ∈ Q s.t.
E 6 (Q) : (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ Q s.t. y 1 ), (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) , (x 3 , y 3 ) ∈ Q s.t. (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) , (x 3 , y 3 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) ∈ Q s.t.
E 13 (Q) : (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ Q s.t. L i to be the number of tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) that make equation E 1 a satisfied for x (i) 3 . For any of the tuples satisfying E 1 b, and any of the tuples satisfying E 1 a, equation E 1 c is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 3 → y 3 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 1 (Q q ) with probability at most
We thus obtain upper bound
Assume the adversary makes a query y
2 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for query y 2 → x 2 ). By Conj. 1, there exist at most q 1 tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that E 1 b is satisfied, except w.p. at most ε c (q, n). This consequently leads to at most q 1 possible values of y (i) 2 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ y 3 . For any of these values, by ¬C 2 (Q i ) there exist at most K 2 combinations of queries (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that y
For any of these K 2 q 1 choices, the adversary breaks
for some c there exist more than K 1 solutions in Q to one of the 3 equations:
C 2 (Q) : for some c there exist more than K 2 solutions in Q to one of the 3 equations:
C 3 (Q) : there exist more than K 2 q solutions in Q to one of the 3 equations:
C 4 (Q) : there exist more than q − 1 solutions in Q to one of the 3 equations:
, and x 2 = x 2 , x 3 = x 3 , and x 2 = x 2 , x 3 = x 3 , and
, and x 2 ⊕ x 3 = x 2 ⊕ x 3 , and x 2 ⊕ y 3 = x 2 ⊕ y 3 , and 
hence with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries y 2 → x 2 , the adversary succeeds with probability at most
3 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for query y 3 → x 3 ). By Conj. 1, there exist at most q 1 tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that E 1 b is satisfied, except w.p. at most ε c (q, n). This consequently leads to at most q 1 possible values of x 2 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ y 3 . Denote L i to be the number of choices (x 2 , y 2 ), x 2 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ y 3 that make equation E 1 c satisfied for y (i) 3 . For any of these L i tuples, equation E 1 a is satisfied with probability at most q/(2 n − q). Considering all queries y 3 → x 3 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 1 (Q q ) with probability at most
at most ε c (q 1 , n). 1 We thus obtain upper bound
Assume the adversary makes a query x
1 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries y 1 → x 1 , x 1 → y 1 or y 1 → x 1 ). By Conj. 1, there exist at most q 1 tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that E 1 b is satisfied, except w.p. at most ε c (q, n). This consequently leads to at most q 1 possible values of x 2 ⊕y 2 ⊕y 3 . Again by Conj. 1, there exist at most d 1 q 1 log q 1 combinations of queries (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that E 1 c is satisfied, except w.p. at most ε c (q 1 , n). For any of these combinations, the adversary breaks
1 ⊕x 2 ⊕x 3 , hence with probability at most 1/(2 n −q). Considering all queries x 1 → y 1 , the adversary succeeds with probability at most
In any case, the success probability is at most
Proof. We write E 2 a, E 2 b and E 2 c for the three equations of E 2 (Q) (Fig. 3) . The approach is similar as before. Assume first the adversary makes a query x
3 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries x 3 → y 3 , x 2 → y 2 or x 2 → y 2 ). By Conj. 1, there exist at most q 1 tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that E 2 b is satisfied, except w.p. at most ε c (q, n). Denote L i to be the number of tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) that make equation E 2 a satisfied for x (i) 3 . For any of the tuples satisfying E 2 b, and any of the tuples satisfying E 2 a, equation E 2 c is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 3 → y 3 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 2 (Q q ) with probability at most except w.p. at most ε c (q, n) . We thus obtain upper bound q 2 1 2 n −q + 2ε c (q, n). Assume the adversary makes a query y
3 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for query y 3 → x 3 , y 2 → x 2 or y 2 → x 2 ). By Conj. 1, there exist at most q 1 tuples ( x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that E 2 b is satisfied, except w.p. at most ε c (q, n) . This consequently leads to at most q 1 possible values of y (i)
3 hits x 1 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ x 2 , hence with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries y 3 → x 3 , the adversary succeeds with probability at most
1 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries y 1 → x 1 , x 1 → y 1 or y 1 → x 1 ). By Conj. 1, there exist at most q 1 tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that E 2 b is satisfied, except w.p. at most ε c (q, n). This consequently leads to at most q 1 possible values of x 1 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ y 3 . For any of these values, by ¬C 2 (Q i ) there exist at most K 2 combinations of queries (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that
hence with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 1 → y 1 , the adversary succeeds with probability at most
Proof. The case of E 3 (Q q ) is fairly similar to the case of E 2 (Q q ) (see Lem. 5), with the difference that the usage of Conj. 1 is replaced with ¬C 3 (Q i ). We write E 3 a, E 3 b and E 3 c for the three equations of E 3 (Q) (Fig. 3) . The cases of queries x 1 , x 1 , y 1 , y 1 , x 3 and x 3 are the same as before (notice that E 3 a and E 3 b can be substituted in E 3 c), resulting in a success probability upper bounded by
2 n −q . Assume the adversary makes a query x
2 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries y 2 → x 2 , x 2 → y 2 or y 2 → x 2 ). As ¬C 3 (Q i ), there exist at most K 2 q tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that E 3 b is satisfied, and this consequently leads to at most K 2 q possible values of x 2 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ x 3 ⊕ y 3 , which behave random. By a slight variant of ¬C 3 (Q i ) (as the previously mentioned values behave random), there exist at most K 2 2 q combinations of queries (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ), (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that x 1 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 3 = x 2 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ x 3 ⊕ y 3 . For any of these combinations, the adversary breaks
2 ⊕ x 3 , hence with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 2 → y 2 , the adversary succeeds with probability at most
2 n −q . Assume the adversary makes a query y
3 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for query y 3 → x 3 ). As ¬C 3 (Q i ), there exist at most K 2 q tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that E 3 b is satisfied, and this consequently leads to at most K 2 q possible values of x 2 ⊕y 2 ⊕x 3 ⊕y 3 . Denote L i to be the number of choices (x 1 , y 1 ), x 1 ⊕y 1 ⊕y 3 that make equation E 3 c satisfied for y (i) 3 . For any of these tuples, equation E 3 a is satisfied with probability at most q/(2 n − q). Considering all queries y 3 → x 3 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 3 (Q q ) with probability at most
2 n −q . In any case, the success probability is at most
2 n −q . The slight variant of C 3 (Q i ) employed in the proof of Lem. 6 embraces the case the adversary has i different tuples (x 1 , y 1 ) and i different tuples (x 3 , y 3 ), but (at most) K 2 i different random values z 2 = x 2 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ x 3 ⊕ y 3 , and aims at finding combinations such that x 1 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ z 2 = x 3 (or similar variants). Rather than introducing a separate claim for this, it suffices to condition for E 3 (Q) on claim C(Q) where K 2ueries are allowed. This observation is used in Sect. A.3, where the results are assembled.
Proof. The case of E 4 (Q q ) is fairly similar to the case of E 1 (Q q ) (see Lem. 4), with the difference that most of the usages of Conj. 1 are replaced with ¬C 3 (Q i ). We write E 4 a, E 4 b and E 4 c for the three equations of E 4 (Q) (Fig. 3) . Note that equation E 4 c reduces to y 2 ⊕x 3 ⊕y 3 = y 2 ⊕ x 3 ⊕ y 3 by substituting equations E 4 a, E 4 b. The cases of queries x 1 , x 1 , y 1 , y 1 , x 3 and x 3 are the same as before. For queries x 2 , x 2 , y 3 and y 3 , one follows the same reasoning as for queries y 2 → x 2 in the analysis of E 1 (Q q ), and for queries y 2 , y 2 one follows the same reasoning as for y 3 → x 3 in the analysis of E 1 (Q q ). Concretely, the success probability is at
Proof. We start with E 11 (Q q ), and write E 11 a, E 11 b for the two equations of E 11 (Q) (Fig. 3) . The approach is similar as before. Assume first the adversary makes a query x
3 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries x 3 → y 3 , x 2 → y 2 or x 2 → y 2 ). By Conj. 1, there exist at most q 1 tuples (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ), (x 1 , y 1 ) such that the second equality of E 11 a is satisfied, except w.p. at most ε c (q, n). For any such choice, as x (i) 3 is fixed there exists at most one (x 2 , y 2 ) such that equation E 11 a is satisfied. For any of the combinations, E 11 b is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 3 → y 3 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 11 (Q q ) with probability at most
3 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries y 3 → x 3 , y 2 → x 2 or y 2 → x 2 ). By Conj. 1, there exist at most q 1 tuples (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ), (x 1 , y 1 ) such that the second equality of E 11 a is satisfied, except w.p. at most ε c (q, n). For any such choice, as y (i) 3 is fixed there exists at most one (x 2 , y 2 ) such that equation E 11 b is satisfied. For any of the combinations, E 11 a is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries y 3 → x 3 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 11 (Q q ) with probability at most1 2 n −q + ε c (q, n). Assume the adversary makes a query x y 3 ) , (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that x 2 ⊕ x 3 = x 2 ⊕ x 3 and y 2 ⊕ y 3 = y 2 ⊕ y 3 . For any such tuple, the adversary succeeds with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 1 → y 1 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 11 (Q q ) with probability at most q 2 2 n −q . In any case, the success probability is at most1 +q 2 2 n −q + ε c (q, n). The cases of E 10 (Q q ), E 12 (Q q ) are fairly similar, with the major difference that one needs to take into account that by ¬C 1 (Q i ) the query history contains at most K 1 collisions x 2 ⊕y 2 = c, for any c, and similar for x 3 . Additionally, for E 12 (Q q ) the usage of Conj. 1 is replaced with ¬C 3 (Q i ). Concretely, the success probabilities are upper bounded by K 11 +q 2 2 n −q + ε c (q, n) for E 10 (Q q ) and
for E 12 (Q q ).
Lemma 9.
Proof. Starting with E 5 (Q q ), for the i th query x
2 for i = 1, . . . , q. As ¬C 1 (Q i ) for K 1 = 1 there does not exist any other query (x 2 , y 2 ) such that
The same reasoning applies to the other events.
A.2 Bounding Occurrence of C(Q q )
In this section, we bound the event C(Q q ) to occur, more specifically the second sum of (12). Notice that this sum by probability theory equals Pr (C(Q q )). However, we can split up the probability as follows:
The probability bounds on C 1 (Q q ), . . . , C 4 (Q q ) (the four quantities of (13)) are obtained in Lems. 10-13. The proofs rely on the following bound, which holds due to Stirling's approximation (b! ≥ (b/e) b for any b):
Proof. We start with the first equation of C 1 (Q q ). Fix any c. For any (x 1 , y 1 ), the equation is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). More than K 1 such tuples give a collision with probability at most
. Now, the result follows by quantifying over the number of choices for c and the number of equations of C 1 (Q q ).
Proof. We start with the first equation of C 2 (Q q ). Fix any c. Assume the adversary makes a query x
makes 2q queries, and as ¬C 1 (Q q ), each "hit" adds at most K 1 solutions. Therefore, the adversary needs at least (K 2 + 1)/K 1 out of at most 2q hits. Consequently, Q q contains more than K 2 solutions to the first equation of C 2 (Q q ) with probability at most
Now, the result follows by quantifying over the number of choices for c and the number of equations of C 2 (Q q ).
Proof. We start with the first equation of C 3 (Q q ), a similar reasoning applies to the other equations. As ¬C 2 (Q q ), for any (x 3 , y 3 ) there are at most K 2 solutions to x 1 ⊕y 1 ⊕x 2 ⊕y 2 = x 3 . As Q q contains q tuples (x 3 , y 3 ), it contains at most K 2 q solutions to the first equation of C 3 (Q q ).
Proof. We start with the first equation of C 4 (Q q ). By construction, there are at most q 3 tuples of queries that satisfy x 2 ⊕ x 3 = x 2 ⊕ x 3 , and the adversary can achieve this number if he makes forward queries only, and we will assume henceforth. For any of these tuples, the second equation is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). More than q − 1 such tuples give a collision with probability at most
Now, the result follows by quantifying over the number of equations of C 4 (Q q ).
A.3 Assembling the Results
Denote by bndE l (q) the bound obtained for conditional events E l (Q q ) (l = 1, . . . , 13, Lems. 4-9), and by bndC l (q) the bound obtained for claim C l (Q q ) (l = 1, . . . , 4, Lems. 10-13). Recall that q 1 = d 1 q log q. Using slight variants of (11-13), one gets
Note that the bound for Adv (q) includes a third sum, the cause of which is explained after Lem. 6. Let ε > 0. In order to prove lim n→∞ Adv col F A k (2 n/2(1−ε) ) = 0 (for k = 1, 2, 3, 4), it suffices to prove that the separate bounds tend to zero for n → ∞. The results of Sects. A.1 and A.2 hold provided K 1 = 1, but still hold for any choice of K 2 . Set K 2 = n − 1. Note that the ε c -parts in the bounds bndE l (q) all approach 0 for q = 2 n/2(1−ε) : in particular, for large enough n we have d 1 q log q < 2 n/2 and K 2 q < 2 n/2 , and Conj. 1 applies. Therefore, we omit the ε c -parts for simplicity. The evaluations are now fairly the same and mostly rely on the fact that for large enough n the bounds behave like αn β 2 nε for some constants α, β. This function clearly tends to 0 for n → ∞. We discuss bndE 1 (q) and bndC 2 (q) in detail. As we consider the asymptotic behavior, without loss of generality we assume n is large enough to obtain 1 2 n −K 2 q ≤ 2 2 n and 1 2 n −q ≤ 2 2 n for q < 2 n/2 . By elementary mathematics,
Consequently, bndE 1 (2 n/2(1−ε) ) ≤ d 2 1 n 4 2 nε , approaching 0 for n → ∞. Similarly, for bndC 2 :
, approaching 0 for n → ∞.
B Proof of Lemma 3(ii)
For F A k (k = 1, 2, 3, 4), where the matrices A k are given in (5), the goal is to prove that Adv (2 2n/3(1−ε) ) = 0 for any ε > 0, demonstrating the asymptotic preimages security of F A 2 . In the remainder of this section, π 1 , π 2 , π 3 are assumed to be three permutations taken uniformly at random from P n , and z denotes any challenge. We will analyze the maximum probability of any adversary A, making at mostueries to his oracles, in finding preimage for F A k , denoted as Adv (q) = Pr (E 17 (Q q )), where the events E l (Q q ) (l ∈ {14, . . . , 17}) are given in Fig. 5 .
E 16 (Q) : (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) ∈ Q s.t. In App. B.1, we will upper bound Pr (E 15 (Q q )). In App. B.2, we provide a tight bound for Pr (E l (Q q )) for l = 14, 16, 17.
B.1 Bounding Occurrence of E 15 (Q q )
In order to bound Pr (E 15 (Q q )), we define a new claim C 2 (Q). This claim equals C 2 (Q) of Fig. 4 restricted to the third equation and for fixed c instead of for any c. In a similar fashion as in (12)-(13), we obtain:
In Lem. 14 we bound the conditioned occurrence of E 15 (Q q ) (the first part (14)), and in Lem. 15 we compute probability on C 2 (Q q ) (the third part of (14)). A bound on C 1 (Q q ) is given in Lem. 10. The results are then assembled to prove lim n→∞ Adv epre F A 2 (2 2n/3(1−ε) ) = 0 for any ε > 0.
Let d 2 be the constant defined in Conj. 1. On input of parameters (q, n), we define ε c (q, n) = Pr β > d 2 q 3/2 of Conj. 1. This quantity tends to 0 for n → ∞ and for q < 2 2n/3 . Lemma 14.
Proof. We write E 15 a and E 15 b for the two equations of E 15 (Q) (Fig. 5) . The approach is similar as before. Assume first the adversary makes a query x
3 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries y 3 → x 3 , x 2 → y 2 and y 2 → x 2 ). Denote L i to be the number of tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) that make equation E 15 a satisfied for x (i) 3 . For any of these tuples, equation E 15 b is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 3 → y 3 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 15 (Q q ) with probability at most
1 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries y 1 → x 1 ). As ¬C 2 (Q i ), there exist at most K 2 tuples (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 3 , y 3 ) such that x 2 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ x 3 ⊕ y 3 = z is satisfied. For any of these tuples, equation E 15 a is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 1 → y 1 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 15 (Q q ) with probability at most
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of the bound for C 2 (Q q ) (Lem. 11). Note that C 2 (Q q ) consists of one equation, and one choice for c only.
Let ε > 0. Similar to App. A.3, in order to prove lim n→∞ Adv epre F A 2 (2 2n/3(1−ε) ) = 0, it suffices to prove that the separate bounds tend to zero for n → ∞. Put K 1 = 2 and K 2 = 2 n/3 − 1. The evaluations are now fairly the same, and we only discuss the bound bndE 15 (q) on E 15 (Q q ). Again, by Conj. 1 the ε c -part goes to 0 for q = 2 2n/3(1−ε) , and we omit it for simplicity. Notice that 1 2 n −q ≤ 2 2 n for q ≤ 2 n−1 . We obtain:
Consequently, bndE 15 (2 2n/3(1−ε) ) ≤ 2d 2 2 nε + 2 2 2n/3ε , which approaches 0 for n → ∞.
B.2 Bounding
Occurrence of E l (Q q ), l = 14, 16, 17
In this section, we prove Pr (E l (Q q )) = Θ(q 2 /2 n ) (l = 14, 16, 17) by providing a lower bound in Lem. 16, and an upper bound in Lem. 17.
Lemma 16. Pr (E l (Q q )) = Ω(q 2 /2 n ) for l = 14, 16, 17.
Proof. We consider E 14 (Q q ), the analysis for the other compression functions is analogous 2 .
We construct an adversary A whose goal is to find tuples (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ π 1 , (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ π 2 , and (x 3 , y 3 ) ∈ π 3 such that E 14 (Q q ) is satisfied. The adversary proceeds as follows. He sets up two lists of q random elements X 1 := {x 2 ) (for k = 1, . . . , q). Additionally, for each k = 1, . . . , q, the adversary sets y
2 ⊕ z and computes the corresponding value x (k)
The adversary obtains a solution for E 14 (Q q ) if X 1 contains an element x 1 such that x 1 ⊕ y 1 = x 2 ⊕ x 3 . By basic probability theory, such x 1 exists with probability Ω(q/2 n ). As the adversary needs to succeed for only one of the q choices of k, he finds a solution for E 14 (Q q ) with probability Ω(q 2 /2 n ).
Lemma 17. Pr (E l (Q q )) = O(q 2 /2 n ) for l = 14, 16, 17.
Proof. We consider E 14 (Q q ), the analysis for the other compression functions is analogous.
We write E 14 a, E 14 b for the two equations of E 14 (Q q ). The approach is similar to before. By basic probability theory,
We start with the first probability and consider K 1 = 1. Assume first the adversary makes a query x
3 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries x 2 → y 2 ). For each of the ≤ q tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), by ¬C 1 (Q i ) the values x 1 ⊕ y 1 are distinct, and there exists at most one (x 2 , y 2 ) such that equation E 14 a is satisfied. For any of the combinations, E 14 b is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 3 → y 3 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 14 (Q q ) with probability at most 3 ) for i = 1, . . . , q. By ¬C 1 (Q i ), there exists at most one tuple (x 2 , y 2 ) such that equation E 14 b is satisfied. For this tuple, E 14 a is satisfied with probability at most q/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 3 → y 3 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 14 (Q q ) with probability at most 2 ) for i = 1, . . . , q. For each of the ≤ q tuples (x 1 , y 1 ), by ¬C 1 (Q i ) the values x 1 ⊕ y 1 are distinct, and there exists at most one (x 3 , y 3 ) such that x 1 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 2 ⊕ x 3 ⊕ y 3 = z. For any of the combinations, E 14 a is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 2 → y 2 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 14 (Q q ) with probability at most 1 ) for i = 1, . . . , q (the same treatment holds for queries y 1 → x 1 ). For each of the ≤ q tuples (x 3 , y 3 ), by ¬C 1 (Q i ) there exists at most one (x 2 , y 2 ) such that equation E 14 b is satisfied. For any of the combinations, E 14 a is satisfied with probability at most 1/(2 n − q). Considering all queries x 1 → y 1 , the adversary succeeds in breaking E 14 (Q q ) with probability at most q 2 2 n −q .
In any case, we obtain q i=1 Pr (E 14 (Q i ) | ¬E 14 (Q i−1 ) ∧ ¬C 1 (Q i )) ≤ q 2 2 n − q . The claim now immediately follows from (15), Lem. 10, and the fact that q ≤ 2 n−1 .
2 The attack defining the lower bound for E16(Qq) corresponds to an attack by Joux described in [11] .
C Generalization of Theorem 2
We generalize our findings on the single-permutation setting to cover any function, where affine transformations on the inputs to the permutations are taken into account. This generalization is straightforward, but technical and more elaborate. For a matrix B = (b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , b 4 ) with elements in {0, 1} n , we define the compression function F AB as follows: 
where A is as in Sect. 2.1. We note that for the multi-permutation setting, this generalization is of no added value, as the permutations are independently distributed anyway. Adding constants is, however, a customary approach to obtain "different" permutations from a single one (e.g. π i (x) = π(b i ⊕ x) for i = 1, 2, 3), but as we will show, the findings of Thm. 2 also apply to this extended setting. We reformulate Props. 1-3 to the case of F AB (recall that Prop. 4 did not apply to the single-permutation setting in the first place). Propositions 1 and 2 apply to any F AB and F A B with B = B and Prop. 3 holds for any B and B with (b i , b i+1 ) = (b i+1 , b i ). Given this, the proof of Thm. 2 almost carries over. Lemmas 1 and 2 apply with straightforward generalization. It remains to evaluate the matrices A of the form (7) for any B ∈ ({0, 1} n )
4×1 .
The case a 3, * ≤ 2 is the same as in the proof of Thm. 2.
a 3, * = 3. Due to M-reductions, it suffices to consider a 31 a 32 a 33 a 34 ∈ {1110, 0111}.
-a 31 a 32 a 33 a 34 = 1110. The same analysis as in Sect. 4.1 applies, leaving the matrices A 1 and A 2 of (5). In the extended single-permutation setting, the two corresponding compression functions satisfy Collisions can thus be trivially found; -a 31 a 32 a 33 a 34 = 0111. By Lem. 2(ii), we have a 41 = 1. Lemma 2(iii) now states that we require a 42 = a 44 , which gives the following four options for a 42 a 43 a 44 : 000, 010, 101 and 111. The first one is vulnerable to the attack of Lem. 2(iv), the second, third and fourth matrix satisfy F AB (x 1 , π −1 (π( Hence, any of the analyzed compression functions either allows for trivial collision or is vulnerable to Lem. 2, therewith allowing for collisions in at most 2 2n/5 queries. Concluding, for any compression function F AB of the generalized form (16), collisions can be found in at most 2 2n/5 queries, hence considerably faster than in 2 n/2 queries.
D Heuristic Argument for Conjecture 1
In this section, we provide a heuristic argument for the first part of Conj. 1, a similar argument applies to part two. Throughout the argument it becomes clear why the conjecture is similar to but more complex than Zarankiewicz problem [2, Ch. 6.2], as claimed in Sect. 4 .
In more detail, we will show that the conjecture should hold for d 1 = 10 for large enough n. Let Z be a given set of q < 2 n/2 random elements. Denote by Pr (succ(Z)) the probability that there exist two sets X 1 , X 2 such that the number of solutions (x 1 , x 2 , z) ∈ X 1 × X 2 × Z with x 1 ⊕ x 2 = z is larger than 10q log q. In this heuristic argument we will provide a bound on Pr (succ(Z)). In fact, we will first consider q = 2 α and show that the number of solutions is with high probability upper bounded by 2q log q + q. If q is no power of two, the number of solutions is then clearly upper bounded by the amount of solutions for q = 2 log q , hence upper bounded by 8q log q + 2q ≤ 10q log q (provided q ≥ 2).
Before proceeding, we pose the following claim on Z:
D1(Z) : there exist z1, z2 ∈ Z such that z1 = z2.
Clearly, Pr (D 1 (Z)) ≤ q 2 /2 n , and by probability theory we have Pr (succ(Z)) ≤ Pr (succ(Z) | ¬D 1 (Z)) + Pr (D 1 (Z)) ≤ Pr (succ(Z) | ¬D 1 (Z)) + q 2 2 n .
Therefore, it suffices to analyze succ(Z) given that Z contains no collisions. The goal for an adversary now is to come up with two sets X 1 = {x (1) 1 , . . . , x
1 } and X 2 = {x (1) 2 , . . . , x
2 } such that {(x 1 , x 2 , z) ∈ X 1 × X 2 × Z | x 1 ⊕ x 2 = z} is maximized.
